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Abstract
We model and analyze passive adversaries that monitors Tor traffic crossing the
border of a jurisdiction an adversary is controlling. We show that a single adversary
is able to connect incoming and outgoing traffic of their border, tracking the traffic,
and cooperating adversaries are able to reconstruct parts of the Tor network, revealing
user-server relationships. In our analysis we created two algorithms to estimate the
capabilities of the adversaries. The first generates Tor-like traffic and the second
analyzes and reconstructs the simulated data.
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1 Introduction
The Onion Routine (Tor) protocol [8] is a well-established onion routing system that tries
to provide a low-latency communications channel while also defending against network-
level adversaries trying to reveal who is talking to whom. It is well understood how the
Tor network behaves when an adversary compromises a fraction of the onion routers, and
in particular that if the entire network is monitored little or no security is left.
In this paper we analyze the power of (coalitions of) less powerful adversaries who do
not monitor onion router traffic directly, but instead partition the network into jurisdic-
tions and monitor traffic crossing from one partition into another.
These kinds of adversaries are interesting because they are real, in particular of the form
of programs to monitor traffic crossing borders. In 2008 the Swedish parliament passed a
bill allowing the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment (Fo¨rsvarets radioanstalt)
to monitor both wireless and cable signals passing the Swedish border [29].
In 2016, the Norwegian government appointed a group of experts to investigate whether
or not the Norwegian Intelligence Service should be allowed access to communication cross-
ing the Norwegian border, similar to the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment.
The investigating report concluded that the Norwegian Intelligence Service should be al-
lowed to monitor the Norwegian border [10], however, this has not yet been put into effect.
It seems likely that other countries have or plan to have similar programs.
∗This work is funded by Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (NSM), www.nsm.stat.no.
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1.1 Related work
Formal analysis of the Tor protocol comes in two variants. The first use an abstract model
of the protocol and gives security bounds based on a worst case adversary [2, 12, 14, 15,
17, 18]. The second includes a detailed description of the protocols in their analysis when
proving the security bound [3, 20, 35]. Backes et al. use their ANOA framework [2] in
their formal analysis [3], where they focus on the Tor path selection algorithm and how it
can be improved.
Adversaries that are able to observe both ends of a Tor circuit is able to correlate the
traffic and connect a user with the server it is communicating with [24, 27]. The literature
has considered a range of different adversarial power: from adversaries that only controls a
portion of the onion routers, adversaries that controls an autonomous system (AS) [13, 33],
or an Internet exchange point (IXP) [25], or several ASes and IXPs [20, 26]. It has been
shown that ASes can observe both ends of Tor circuits [35]. Tor path selection algorithms
has been proposed to avoid detection from ASes [1, 11].
Encrypting messages hides its content, but not necessarily the message’s length. An
adversary with access to timing, packet size, and directionality of packets, sent over an
encrypted HTTP tunnel, can use this information to launch traffic analysis attacks to
reveal the identity of the server and user [4, 6, 19, 22, 32, 37]. Countermeasures to traffic
analysis attacks in the literature includes padding messages [7] and morphing Tor traffic
to mimic traffic associated to other servers [37]. However, hiding the packet length is
insufficient [9].
Using a Tor network simulator makes it possible to analyze the effectiveness of adver-
saries versus the Tor protocol. Examples of such programs are Shadow with Tor plugin [30]
and The Tor Path Simulator [34].
In the network intrusion detection literature a stepping stone is an intermediate node
used by an attacker to conceal his identity. Algorithms used to detect stepping stones
analyses streams of traffic to confirm or reject the existence of intermediate nodes between
the analyzed traffic streams [5, 36].
1.2 Our contribution
In this paper we model and discuss a specific adversary versus the Tor protocol. The
jurisdictional adversary is similar to an adversary controlling AS(es) or IXP(s), however,
the ASes and IXPs are typically located inside a jurisdiction whereas we consider a passive
adversary that only monitors traffic crossing the border of a jurisdiction. Further, an
adversary controlling an AS or an IXP would see all traffic inside their network whereas
an adversary monitoring jurisdictional borders would not.
We simulate a Tor-like network and the adversaries using two algorithms, a Tor net-
work simulator and a reconstruction algorithm. The reconstruction algorithm is given
traffic data generated in the Tor simulator and use this information to reconstruct the
simulated network and connect users with the server they are communicating with. The
reconstruction algorithm uses the timing, packet size, and directionality of packets in the
reconstruction, that is, traffic analysis. We chose to write our own Tor network simulator
since we wanted to partition the nodes into jurisdictions and have data we could use in
the reconstruction algorithm.
In the simulations we look at both fixed (padded) and variable packet size to see if
hiding the packet size is a possible countermeasures to the traffic analysis done by the
adversaries. We do not morph the Tor traffic since the adversaries are only interested in
the existence of traffic and not what it looks like.
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Figure 1: Example Tor circuit with the default setting of three onion routers. U denotes
a user, OR an onion router, and S a server.
Algorithms used to detect stepping stones analyzes streams of traffic to find inter-
mediate nodes between the streams. Similarly, our reconstruction algorithm attempts to
connect stream of traffic between known onion routers to recreate circuits. The techniques
used to detect stepping stones could be used to detect onion routers and connect its in-
coming and outgoing traffic. The difference between the stepping stone literature and our
work is the adversary we are modeling and analyzing, where we assume that the location
of all onion routers is already known and we want to connect Tor traffic to reconstruct
Tor circuits.
1.3 Overview
In Section 3 we model the jurisdictional adversaries monitoring Tor traffic crossing their
borders. This model is employed in the simulation algorithm.
In Section 4.1 we describe the Tor network simulation algorithm that generates Tor-like
traffic. This traffic is used by the Tor reconstruction algorithm described in Section 4.2.
In Section 5 we show the results from our simulation and reconstruction algorithms.
We include a benchmark, showing the dependability of the reconstruction algorithm, two
parameter experiments, which show how different parameter choices affects the recon-
struction results, and an example using real world data.
We conclude with a short discussion of the jurisdictional adversaries in Section 6,
where we look at a possible path countermeasure against this specific adversary and give
a summary of their adversarial power.
2 Background
2.1 Anonymity
In an anonymous communication network there are different notions of anonymity that an
adversary might want to break. If an adversary can reveal the identity of a user then the
sender anonymity is broken. If an adversary is able to distinguish between the scenario
where a single user sends two messages from the scenario where two users sends a single
message each then the sender unlinkability is broken. If an adversary connects a user with
the server it is communicating with then the relationship anonymity is broken [28].
Sender anonymity is the strongest notion, since it implies both sender unlinkability and
relationship anonymity. Neither sender unlinkability nor relationship anonymity implies
sender anonymity [2].
2.2 Tor
The Onion Router (Tor) protocol is an anonymous communication protocol [8] that allows
Tor users to hide which server they are communicating with. The Tor protocol uses
intermediate nodes called onion routers to achieve anonymity, where each onion router
only knows the identity of its neighboring nodes. A user establishes a circuit in the Tor
network to communicate with a server, see Figure 1. The last onion router in a circuit
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(a) A physical network with
routers (squares) and comput-
ers (circles).
(b) A logical network with only
computers (circles).
(c) Our model of an overlay net-
work with three jurisdictions.
Figure 2: The basic idea of our model is to describe the physical network as a logical net-
work and partition the leaf nodes into jurisdictions. Traffic sent between two jurisdictions
is observed by both and traffic sent inside a jurisdiction is not observed by anyone.
communicates with the server on behalf of the user. For simplicity we assume that all
circuits consist of one user, three onion routers, and one server, which is the default Tor
configuration. Restricting circuits to contain only three onion routers is not essential for
our reconstruction algorithm.
A Tor circuit is constructed incrementally, when a user creates a circuit it picks three
onion router and establishes a shared key with each router. The user first performs a key
exchange with the first onion router in the circuit, then a second key exchange with the
second onion router, via the first, and finally the last key exchange with the third onion
router, via the first and second onion router. Only when the circuit is complete can the
user communicate with the server.
2.3 Notation
We denote jurisdictions as J or Ji, for some index i. Observing traffic sent between the
two nodes N1 and N2 is denoted as observing the connection (N1, N2). Observing two
connections (N1, N2) and (N2, N3) which is connected by the common node N2 is denoted
as reconstructing the partial circuit (N1, N2, N3). Similar, two connections (N1, N2) and
(N3, N4) which is believed to be connected is denoted as reconstructing the partial circuit
(N1, N2, N3, N4).
3 Modeling jurisdictional adversaries
The physical network of the Internet consists of routers and computers that are connected
by cables. We can describe this network as a graph with the routers as nodes, the com-
puters as leaf nodes, and the cables as edges, see Figure 2a. The logical network is a graph
describing the flow of data between the computers. The difference of the two representa-
tions is that the physical network shows the location of the various nodes and edges, while
the logical is a complete graph that only shows the computers nodes and a direct edge
connecting them, see Figure 2b.
We can describe the graph induced by the Tor protocol as a logical network, where
the graph describes the flow of data sent by the protocol. The graph describing the Tor
network is called an overlay network, where the users, onion routers, and server are leaf
nodes.
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U or S OR OR U or S OR1 OR2
(a) Case 1: traffic is sent from a
user U or server S to an onion
router OR.
(b) Case 2: traffic is sent from
an onion router OR to a user U
or server S.
(c) Case 3: traffic is sent from
an onion router OR1 to another
onion router OR2.
Figure 3: The three types of connections that the adversaries can observe. In each figure,
the left jurisdiction observes outgoing traffic and the right jurisdiction observes incoming
traffic.
3.1 Tor overlay network with jurisdictional adversaries
In our overlay model of the Tor protocol we include adversaries monitoring all Tor traffic
crossing the border of a jurisdiction they control. That is, we have a set of jurisdictions
and each jurisdiction has an adversary that monitors its border. The users, onion routers,
and servers are represented as nodes. Each node in the overlay model will be located
inside one of the jurisdictions, where the jurisdictions are connected in a complete graph,
as in Figure 2c.
This model is a simplification of the real world situation. Traffic between two nodes
inside a jurisdiction could very well cross the jurisdiction’s borders in the physical network.
In fact, since routing is dynamic, it could cross borders one day and not cross borders the
next. Hence, the adversaries probably get less information in our model than in the real
world.
Modeling the jurisdictions as fully connected is probably also too generous. In the real
world, depending on the jurisdictions, this might not be the case. Again, the adversaries
probably get less information in our model than in the real world.
3.1.1 Observable and reconstructible traffic
When a Tor circuit crosses the borders of a jurisdiction the adversary observes one of the
following three cases. Case 1, traffic sent from a user or a server to an onion router, see
Figure 3a. Case 2, traffic sent from an onion router to a user or a server, see Figure 3b.
Case 3, traffic sent from an onion router to another, see Figure 3c. That is, the adversaries
can observe the following connections crossing their border
(U,OR), (S,OR), (OR,U), (OR,S), or (OR,OR).
Note that for each connection two jurisdictions are able to observe it. In each case shown
in Figure 3, the left jurisdiction observes the traffic as outgoing and the right jurisdiction
observes the traffic as incoming. Since Tor traffic usually visit only one onion router inside
a country (jurisdiction) it should be possible for a jurisdiction to connect its observed
incoming Case 1 or Case 2 traffic with an outgoing Case 2 or Case 3 traffic. An incoming
and outgoing connection can be combined if their timestamps and packet size difference
is small, that is, if they are most likely part of the same circuit.
In Section 4 we show that the adversaries are able to connect their observed incoming
and outgoing connections if they observe enough traffic. Therefore, they can reconstruct
the following two cases. Case 4, the incoming and outgoing traffic of the jurisdiction
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OR OR1 OR2
(a) Case 4: the observed connections share a
common node and fits in timing and packet size
(b) Case 5: the observed connections fits in tim-
ing and packet size
Figure 4: The adversaries are able to connect their observed incoming and outgoing traffic,
see Figure 3, to create partial circuits.
connects in a common node inside the jurisdiction and their timing and packet size fits,
see Figure 4a. Case 5, the timing and packet size of the incoming and outgoing fits,
see Figure 4b. The Case 5 connections need more traffic than the Case 4 since it is not
connected via a common node. Given enough traffic, the adversaries are able to construct
the following partial circuits
(U,OR1, OR2), (OR1, OR2, S), (OR1, OR2, OR3),
(U,OR1, OR2, OR3), (OR1, OR2, OR3, S), or (U,OR1, OR2, S).
The middle node(s) are located inside the jurisdiction and the edge nodes are located
outside, see Figure 4.
4 Simulation and reconstructing
In our algorithms we assume that the adversaries are able to recognize Tor traffic, since
onion routers usually only send Tor traffic to other nodes and all onion routers are known.
Hence, we only generate Tor traffic.
Further, we assume that the adversaries have analyzed the distribution of timing and
packet size patterns of Tor traffic. They will use this knowledge to statistically connect
traffic entering and exiting their jurisdiction. We base our timing on previous measure-
ments [23], and we look at both fixed and variable packet size (to study the effect of
padding countermeasures).
With these algorithms we can simulate and analyze different kinds of Tor traffic, mea-
sure how many of the reconstructed circuits reveals the relationship, and how much of the
simulated Tor network we can reconstruct.
4.1 Tor simulator
The simulation algorithm employ the overlay network model described in Section 3.1. The
traffic generated in the simulation does not include any cryptographic computations, we
only include timing, packet size, and direction of traffic.
The simulation starts by creating a selected number of onion router and server nodes
and partition them into jurisdictions, that is, we initialize a universe. The simulation runs
for a fixed amount of seconds, it only needs a few seconds to simulate half an hour of
traffic in the Tor network.
While the simulation is running it randomly executes one of the four actions below
according to a specified distribution. When an action is completed a new is picked and
executed. The distribution is set before the simulation starts and can be changed while
running.
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Add user: adds a user node to one of the jurisdictions and creates a circuit for the user.
Remove user: picks an active user with a circuit and destroys its circuit, this makes the
user inactive.
Create new circuit: picks an active user with a circuit, destroys its old circuit, and
creates a new circuit for the user.
Send traffic: picks an active user with a circuit and sends one packet from the user to the
server. The server responds with a random number of packets to the user (between
1 and 5).
If there is no active users in the network then the add user action is initiated. Note that
the number of responds sent from the server is a pessimistic number compared to real
world traffic, more responds would improve the reconstruction results.
When we create a Tor circuit we make it incrementally, as specified in Section 2.2.
The onion routers does not have any specific classification (for example entry or exit) and
can be in any position of a circuit.
Destroying a Tor circuit is only initiated by the user. The onion routers receives a tear
down circuit command, which they forward to the next onion router in the circuit.
The simulation stores the communication information sent between two nodes as a
connection,
Connection =
(
sender, receiver, (time stamp, packet size)
)
.
The connection contains the identity of the sender node, receiver node, direction of traffic,
and the time stamp and packet size for when the traffic crossed a border.
When the simulation is concluded the connections are sorted to the jurisdictions. A
connection is given to a jurisdiction J if sender ∈ J and receiver /∈ J or if sender /∈ J
and receiver ∈ J . That is, the traffic crosses the borders of J . Each jurisdiction classify
its connection as either incoming or outgoing, as discussed in Section 3.1.1.
4.2 Tor reconstructor
In the reconstruction we only analyze the data collected by jurisdictions that are going
to cooperate in breaking the relationship anonymity of the Tor users. Each participating
jurisdiction starts by connecting their incoming and outgoing connection and stores the
processed data as partial circuits,
Partial circuit =
(
sender, (intermediate), receiver,
(time stamps, packets)sender,
(time stamps, packets)recevier, score
)
.
The sender and receiver are the end points of the partial circuit. There can be none or
more that one intermediate nodes. The time stamps and packets are stored as lists, where
the sender list is traffic sent to and from the sender and, similarly, the receiver list is
traffic sent to and from the receiver. The score is used to check if the partial circuit is
real, that is, a part of a real circuit used in the simulation.
To create partial circuits the reconstruction start by looking for outgoing Case 1 con-
nections and incoming Case 2 connections, that is, circuit endpoints which cannot be
reconstructed with other observed connections. These connection are stored as partial
circuits of length two and removed. These partial circuits will be used to supplement
partial circuits of length three, by adding any additional time stamps and packet sizes.
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To reconstruct Case 4 and 5 partial circuits each jurisdiction connects their observed
incoming and outgoing connections which has not been removed, that is, incoming Case 1,
outgoing Case 2, and Case 3 connections. For every incoming connection the jurisdiction
check all outgoing connections if they fits with the incoming based on the timing and
packet size. If the time difference of the incoming and outgoing connection is within the
expected value it is given a score based on the time difference. The closer the measured
time difference is to the expected time difference the higher score it is given. An incoming
connection is only matched with the outgoing connection that results in the highest score.
The scoring system is used to check if a partial circuit is real. Whenever a jurisdiction
stores a partial circuit it first check if it has already made a similar partial circuit previ-
ously. If it has then the existing partial circuit receives the additional time stamp, packet
size, and the new score is added to the existing score. If not then a new partial circuit is
stored.
It is easier to reconstruct Case 4 partial circuits since they share a common node,
whereas a Case 5 partial circuit is only connected because it fits based on the timing.
Hence, a Case 5 partial circuit needs a higher score for it to be real. Any partial circuit
with a low score will not be used in the rest of the reconstruction. A partial circuit has a
low score if it is less than 95% probability to be real. The low score value is determined
from the algorithms.
When all observed connections has been processed, the reconstruction algorithm starts
to connect partial circuit into circuits. The jurisdictions look for partial circuits that
overlap, that is, share two nodes, and connects them into longer partial circuits. The
better two partial circuits overlap the higher score the connected partial circuit is given.
Overlapping partial circuits should have the same time stamps and packet sizes if they are
part of the same circuit. The more packet sizes and time stamps that is present in both
partial circuits the higher score the new partial circuit is given.
When all partial circuits has been processed the algorithms outputs a list of circuits
which is evaluated. Reconstructed circuits are either real circuits, circuits which was used
in the simulated Tor network, or imagined circuits, circuits which was not used. The
output circuits are classified as either assumed real circuits, which will be accepted, or
assumed imagined circuits, which will be discarded. The classification is based on the
circuit’s score.
We verify the result of the reconstruction algorithm by checking the assumed real and
assumed imagined circuits. We compare the circuits in the output list with the circuits
used in the simulated Tor network. Assumed real circuits shown to be real and assumed
imagined circuits shown to be imagined shows the reconstruction algorithm is dependable.
On the other hand, if an assumed real circuits was imagined then the reconstruction
algorithm creates false circuits and accuse users to communicate with server they did not.
Similarly, if an assumed imagined circuit was real then either the user of the circuit did
not send enough traffic or the algorithm is unable to detect all circuits. Both of these
results disproves the algorithm’s dependability.
The real circuits are classified as either relationship revealing circuit, showing both the
user and server, or a partial circuit that either shows only the user, only the server, or
only onion routers. A partial circuit does not show both the user and server, however it
can show the user breaking the sender anonymity.
The runtime of our implementation of the reconstruction algorithm is, essentially,
quadratic in the traffic volume per time interval.
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Table 1: Benchmark results showing the dependability of the reconstruction algorithm.
The algorithm outputs circuits which was either used in the Tor network simulator, a real
circuit, or a circuit which was not, an imagined circuit.
(a) Percentages are of all Tor circuits created in the Tor network simulator algorithm.
Median and 95% confidence interval (in percentage)
6 jurisdictions 10 jurisdictions 15 jurisdictions Fixed packet size
47.34 [46.04, 48.36] 62.62 [61.54, 64.24] 71.41 [70.61, 73.09] % relationships revealed
77.19 [76.46, 78.08] 85.88 [85.34, 86.59] 89.97 [89.6, 90.77] % reconstructed
Variable packet size
52.76 [51.78, 54.74] 66.21 [64.87, 68.17] 73.47 [72.66, 74.89] % relationships revealed
81.80 [81.22, 82.56] 88.64 [88.06, 89.44] 91.62 [91.35, 92.07] % reconstructed
(b) Percentages are of all circuits recreated by the reconstruction algorithm.
Median and 95% confidence interval (in percentage)
6 jurisdictions 10 jurisdictions 15 jurisdictions Fixed packet size
11.15 [7.66, 12.53] 6.92 [5.68, 8.46] 5.20 [4.30, 6.35] % imagined circuits
0.04 [0.0, 0.11] 0.03 [0.0, 0.11] 0.03 [0.0, 0.14] % imagined circuits discarded
0.79 [0.53, 1.14] 0.75 [0.47, 1.03] 0.67 [0.50, 0.96] % real circuits discarded
Variable packet size
0.12 [0.0, 0.31] 0.04 [0.0, 0.17] 0.0 [0.0, 0.11] % imagined circuits
0.0 [0.0, 0.07] 0.0 [0.0, 0.08] 0.0 [0.0, 0.04] % imagined circuits discarded
0.0 [0.0, 0.04] 0.0 [0.0, 0.04] 0.0 [0.0, 0.04] % real circuits discarded
5 Results
We have two measurements of the real circuits output by the reconstruction algorithm, a
relationship revealing percentage and a reconstruction percentage.
The relationship revealing percentage shows how many of the real circuits shows both
the user and the server. That is, how many circuits the adversaries have broken the
relationship anonymity.
The reconstruction percentage shows how much of the simulated Tor network has
been reconstructed. All, real, partial circuits of length longer than three is included in
this percentage and contains partial circuits that shows either a user, a server, only onion
routers, or both user and server.
We include four experiments in our results. First, we show benchmarks that demon-
strate the dependability of the reconstruction algorithm. Second, we look at how the
number of jurisdictions alter the results. Third, we change the network pattern in the Tor
simulation to see how different types of Tor traffic affects the adversary’s reconstruction.
Fourth, we show a real world example to see how many nonuniform jurisdictions is needed
to successfully reveal relationships. Note that the jurisdictions have uniform size in the
three first experiments.
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(a) Fixed packet size. (b) Variable packet size.
Figure 5: Increasing the number of jurisdictions. The number of nodes and the network
pattern is fixed.
5.1 Benchmark
The benchmark checks the dependability of the reconstruction algorithm. In these simu-
lations all jurisdictions cooperate in revealing the relationships. We run six benchmarks,
two for 6 jurisdictions, two for 10 jurisdictions, and two for 15 jurisdictions. For each
jurisdiction size we run one with fixed packet size and one with variable. Each iteration of
the benchmark is initialized with a fixed number of jurisdictions, a fixed number of nodes,
and the network pattern is fixed. See Table 2 for the initialization values.
Table 1a shows how much of the Tor circuits the adversaries are able to reveal the
relationships of and how much of the network they are able to reconstruct. Table 1b
shows the dependability of the reconstruction algorithm. It looks at how many reconstruct
circuits are imagined circuits, if we correctly discards the imagined circuits, and if we
incorrectly discards the real circuits.
The fixed packet size simulations only use the time stamps in the analysis and does not
achieve as good results as the variable packet size simulations, which use both the time
stamps and the packet size. We see that having fixed packet size increases the probability
of reconstructing imagined circuit and it is higher for smaller cooperation sizes. In the
fixed packet size simulations the jurisdictions recreate between 5.2% and 11.15% imagined
circuits, compared to the total number of recreated circuits, where the variable packet
size simulations has almost no imagined circuits. Hence, padding traffic has an effect on
the reconstruction. A more thorough analysis and improved algorithm might reduce the
number of imagined circuits.
For a circuit to be discarded it needs to have a low score. There are almost no
reconstructed circuits with a low score because we discard all partial circuits with a low
score before we start connecting them.
5.2 Changing the parameters
We can initialize the algorithm with different parameter settings to see when it is difficult
for the adversaries to reveal the relationship of the users. In the first experiment we
gradually change the number of jurisdictions and in the second we gradually change the
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(a) Fixed packet size. (b) Variable packet size.
Figure 6: Changing the network pattern by increasing the frequency the users create new
circuits.
network pattern. In these simulations all jurisdictions cooperate.
For each experiment we run one with fixed packet size and one with variable. In the
results, there seems to be a small difference between the fixed and variable packet size
results, however, the variable packet size simulations create circuits that are more likely
to be real as shown in the benchmark, see Section 5.1.
5.2.1 Changing the number of jurisdictions
We increase the number of jurisdictions while keeping the number of nodes fixed, making a
finer grid around the nodes which makes the cooperating jurisdictions observe more traffic.
See Table 3 for the initialization values, the nodes are uniformly distributed amongst the
jurisdictions. The results is shown in Figure 5.
A cooperation size of 10 jurisdictions is able to reach around 50% relationship revealing
percentage. To reach above 80% the cooperation size of should be at least 30. The
percentage stabilizes above 40 jurisdictions.
5.2.2 Changing network pattern
We increase the frequency the users create new circuits. We start at having the users
creating only one, never recreating any new circuits, and gradually change until the users
creates a new circuit for every packet sent. The number of nodes and jurisdictions is fixed,
see Table 4 for the initialization values, the nodes are uniformly distributed amongst the
jurisdictions. The results is shown in Figure 6.
We observe that the less frequent a users creates new circuits gives better results for
the adversary. Since the more traffic the users send over the same circuit the more data
the jurisdictions have to determine if the observed traffic is part of the same circuit or not.
Similarly, the more frequent users create new circuits the less traffic is sent over the same
circuits.
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(f) Size 14, variable packet size
Figure 7: Real world parameter simulations. The size shows the number of cooperating
jurisdictions. The expected max relationship percentage shows the expected maximal
obtainable relationship revealing percentage given an optimal reconstruction algorithm
and enough traffic.
5.3 Real world example
We have seen that different parameter choices change the results, hence, we want to know
how many real world countries is needed to efficiently break the relationship anonymity
Tor users. Although we say real world the simulation would not picture the real world
exactly since our model does not.
The number of jurisdictions in the simulation is the number of cooperating adversaries
plus one. The extra jurisdiction is the rest of the world and it does not participate in
the reconstruction algorithm, only in the simulation. The number of onion routers per
jurisdiction is sampled from a Tor network status web page [31]. The remaining nodes,
the users and servers, are distributed according to the distribution of onion routers such
that the size of the jurisdictions do not change. See Table 5 for the initialization values,
the number of onion routers per jurisdiction is in Table 6. Note that the nodes are not
uniformly distributed in these experiment.
We picked the following three sets of countries, because the smaller sets are included
in any of the larger sets, that is, an increasing set of cooperating jurisdictions. We denote
the sets by their cooperation size: Size 5, Size 9, and Size 14. They are also known as
Five Eyes, Nine Eyes, and Fourteen Eyes [16].
Size 5 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Size 9 Previous five plus Denmark, France, Netherlands, and Norway.
Size 14 Previous nine plus Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.
There is a total of six, ten, and fifteen jurisdictions in the Tor network simulation (the
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cooperation size plus the rest of the world). We also change the network pattern, as in
Figure 6, to get a range of different results. The results of the real world example is shown
in Figure 7.
We observe that for a cooperation size of five jurisdictions only reveal between 0% and
1% of the relationships, nine jurisdictions between 3% and 8%, and fourteen jurisdictions
between 12% and 25%. The less frequent the users creates new circuits the higher the
percentage is.
To put these results in perspective we include the expected max relationship percent-
age, which shows the expected maximal obtainable relationship revealing percentage given
an optimal reconstruction algorithm and enough traffic. The expected max relationship re-
vealing percentage is 17.03% for the Size 5 cooperation, 45.83% for the Size 9, and 69.32%
for the Size 14 cooperation. This implies that better reconstruction algorithm could ex-
ist, however, even a perfect algorithm cannot achieve maximum relationship revealing
percentage if the users does not send enough traffic.
The expected max relationship percentage is estimated using the simulator. We sim-
ulated the same scenario and check whether or not it the recreating algorithm would be
able to reconstruct the circuits created in the simulated network. This process is repeated
to get a good estimate. A circuit is reconstructible if the first and the last connection
crosses a border, that is, the adversaries is able to see both the user and server of the
circuit.
For the Size 5 cooperation the reconstructed percentage is between 26% and 33%, for
Size 9 it is between 44% and 55%, and for Size 14 it is between 57% and 71%. Even the
Size 5 set is capable of reconstructing close to one third of the simulated Tor network.
Although the fixed and variable packet size results looks the same, the constructed
circuits is more likely to be real in the variable packet size situation, as showed in Sec-
tion 5.1.
6 Discussions
6.1 Path selection countermeasure
In Section 3.1.1 we discussed the three cases the adversaries can observe. The only connec-
tion which do not show the a user or the a server is traffic is sent between onion routers.
If the Tor circuit is created such that the traffic that crosses the jurisdictional borders is
sent between onion routers then the adversaries cannot see the user or the server and are
never able to connect them.
The following path selection prevents the jurisdictional adversaries breaking the rela-
tionship anonymity. A user U ∈ JU , for a jurisdiction JU , wants to connect to a server
S ∈ JS , for a jurisdiction JS . The user chooses the onion routers as follows: OR1 ∈ JU ,
OR2 ∈ J , for any jurisdiction J , and OR3 ∈ JS . This means that the entry node is inside
the jurisdiction of the user and the exit node is inside the jurisdiction of the server. The
second onion router OR2 can be chosen uniformly at random from any jurisdiction. The
jurisdictions observing traffic sent on this circuit would only see (OR,OR) connections and
are unable to reveal the relationship, see Figure 8.
To prevent the adversaries breaking the sender anonymity the third node OR3 can be
chosen uniformly at random from any jurisdiction. That is, the user chooses the onion
routers as follows: OR1 ∈ JU , OR2 ∈ J and OR3 ∈ J
′, for any jurisdiction J and J ′.
Note that these path selections only avoids the jurisdictional adversaries, it is possible
that other types adversaries could break the sender and/or relationship anonymity if the
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U OR1 OR2 OR3 S
Figure 8: Path selection where the jurisdictional adversaries are unable to connect the
user U with the server S since they only observe (OR,OR) connections.
users use this path selections.
6.2 Passive global adversaries
We claim that the best attack the jurisdictional adversary can do is to passively observe
Tor traffic. Tor uses a TLS connection between Tor entities, which provides confidentiality
and message integrity [7], which implies that Tor is IND–CCA [21]. Any active attack
against messages sent between Tor entities will be detected and prevented, and the best
attack the adversaries can do is, therefore, to passively observe Tor traffic (and possibly
stop traffic).
An active attacker that corrupts onion router can potentially retrieve more information
than the passive jurisdictional adversaries. As we mention in Section 6.1, if the observed
traffic is sent between two onion routers then the passive adversary cannot reveal the user
or the server. An active attacker corrupting onion routers inside the jurisdiction could.
The jurisdictional adversary is blind for any traffic inside the jurisdiction, while an active
attacker can have nodes inside the jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional adversaries indirectly monitor all onion routers inside its jurisdiction.
If the jurisdictional adversaries cooperates in reconstructing Tor circuits they quickly
become global, since they indirectly monitor a large portion of the Tor nodes. In addition,
a large set of jurisdictions has the power to reveal the relationship of a circuit if they
choose to do so.
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A Initialization values for simulations
Table 2: Initialization values for the benchmark simulations.
Description Value(s)
Iterations 50
Tor simulation runtime 5s
Setup nodes ORs: 6000
Ss: 20000
Jurisdiction size 6
10
15
Network pattern New circuit: 10%
Add user: 10%
Remove user: 10%
Send traffic: 70%
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Table 3: Initialization values for the changing jurisdiction size simulations. The jurisdic-
tion size starts at five and is increased by five in every fifth iteration.
Description Value(s)
Iterations 50
Tor simulation runtime 5s
Setup nodes ORs: 6000
Ss: 20000
Jurisdiction size At start: 5
Size increase: 5
Step: 5
Network pattern New circuit: 10%
Add user: 10%
Remove user: 10%
Send traffic: 70%
Table 4: Initialization values for the changing the network pattern simulations. The New
circuit increase value is 10 percentage points and the send traffic decrease value is 10
percentage points. The network pattern is changed in every fifth iteration.
Description Value(s)
Iterations 45
Tor simulation runtime 5s
Setup nodes ORs: 6000
Ss: 20000
Jurisdiction size 20
Network pattern New circuit: 0%
Add user: 10%
Remove user: 10%
Send traffic: 80%
New circuit increase: 10 pp
Send traffic decrease: 10 pp
Step: 5
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Table 5: Initialization values for the real world simulations. The New circuit increase
value is 20 percentage points and the send traffic decrease value is 20 percentage points.
The network pattern is changed in every fifth iteration.
Description Value(s)
Iterations 25
Tor simulation runtime 5s
Setup nodes ORs: 6613
Ss: 20000
Jurisdiction size See Table 6
Network pattern New circuit: 0%
Add user: 10%
Remove user: 10%
Send traffic: 80%
New circuit increase: 20 pp
Send traffic decrease: 20 pp
Step: 5
Table 6: List of selected jurisdictions with their number of nodes and cooperating set.
Note that Size 5 is included in Size 9, and Size 5 and Size 9 is included in Size 14. The
numbers was sampled at 2017-11-02 from [31].
Jurisdiction Number of ORs Set
Australia 50 Size 5
Canada 262 Size 5
New Zealand 14 Size 5
UK 258 Size 5
USA 1092 Size 5
Denmark 48 Size 9
France 910 Size 9
Netherlands 508 Size 9
Norway 52 Size 9
Belgium 24 Size 14
Germany 1331 Size 14
Italy 66 Size 14
Spain 54 Size 14
Sweden 190 Size 14
Total 6613
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